The SEC uses the new Market Data Infrastructure Rule 614 and this CT Plan in hope to bring down cost of consolidated equity market data for all investors by introducing more competition. In doing so misaligned incentives, disputes, rebates, and what not with market data would be regulated under a comprehensive copyright licensing mechanism across fragmented markets (Lit, Dark Venues, and Internalizers), thus promoting the interests of fair and orderly markets and the protections of public interest.ģ. To address the broader problems as mentioned in point 1 above, the definition of “fees” should be replaced with a royalty payment concept. We may have been subtle in our whitepaper in explaining how the analogy and application of it in the context of market data. We may be too advance in our thinking “Should market participants be compensated, and how, when aggregators sell market data?” Perhaps the Commission is only focused on the ‘dissemination’ of market data, while we also consider the ‘reproduction’, ‘redistribution’, and other ‘performance’ and/or ‘licensing’ the use of whoever’s trade data.
We could have better articulate what we meant by the definition of “fees” should be “similar to the comprehensiveness in defining ‘royalties for copyright works’ in the music industry. For that, we identified this point in our second comment letter, while other industry members remained silent. Yet, the “fees” definition remains unchanged. All of these are welcome changes to strengthen governance control. Such as expanding the definition of “Company Indemnified Party”, “Cover Persons” to include SRO Applicant Observers, and to delete the phrase, “and the employers of Non-SRO Voting Representatives”, and revising the definitions of “Executive Session”, “Member Observer”, “Highly Confidential Information”, “Party to a Processing” to include Non-SRO representative. We applaud the SEC for modifying many of the definitions in the CT Plan. Under what definitions and how broad is the scope? This is a classic problem of an “ animal farm” – everyone negotiates to be more equal, but some are more equal than others.Ģ. In our opinion, the problem should be more broadly defined as “who owns the data”? In this warring states period, elites are getting 32 mils super tier rebate and other privileges while others may get nothing. We believe, however, that there are bigger problems should be addressed in concert with this market data reform. We acknowledge this as one of the market structure problems. Securities Information Processors (SIP) public market data feeds which are controlled by the large exchange groups significantly underperforms as compared to proprietary data feeds sold by ‘for-profit’ stock exchanges with monopoly power.
Should the market celebrate? Let’s see the details.
#DATA BOILER TECHNOLOGIES LLC UPDATE#
They may introduce lawsuits, shuffle incentive privileges and/or update fees to make up for their losses. The three large exchange groups are likely infuriated by the aggressiveness of the SEC. We thank the Commission for recognizing our comments over 60 times, making modifications favoring stronger governance controls, and taking the time to clarify certain control aspects that were not obvious or explicitly prescribed under CT Plan but are still covered under securities laws and regulations. This CT Plan replaces the three existing plans (CTA, CQ, and UTP Plans) that currently govern the collection, consolidation, processing, and dissemination of Securities Information Processor (SIP) data.
On August 6, 2021, the SEC quietly approved a modified version of the CT Plan.
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